Abstract: Radio frequency identification-enabled supply chain systems are in an open system environment, where different organisations have different business workflows and operate on different standards and protocols. This supply-chain environment can only be effective if the partners can trust each other and be collaborative. However, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) involves growing privacy and security concerns in part because humans cannot sense the radio frequency radiation used to read tags and the tags themselves maintain no history of past readings. Counterfeiting in the form of cloned or fraudulent RFID tags is a consequence of a lack of security measures and trust among the partners when RFID technology is used to automate their business transactions. This paper discusses the ways in which privacy and security protection can be maintained in an open-loop RFID supply chain. A cost-based detection of counterfeit tags using different classifiers is presented.
Nevertheless, the intention of using RFID should be supported with high confidence among partner organisations. The study of tradeoff between trust and risk shows that trust is always higher when risk is low. Therefore trust management plays an important role as an instrument of decision making when deciding whether a system is worthwhile to be used with a minimal risk (Kutvonen, 2005) . The tradeoff of trust is considered against risk handling, data security and data privacy management. Trust decrement among business partners in the adoption of RFID-enabled technology happens because of two main issues. First, the security and privacy threats in RFID reduce the levels of trust and confidence especially when RFID tagging is used for anti-counterfeiting purposes. Second, the lack of an attack detection model in the RFID network makes the security and privacy threats go unnoticed.
A privacy concern is on retailer"s inventory data which holds significant financial values for an organization and, without any security measurement on RFID tags, may be eavesdropped by competitors and unauthorized readers (Gao et al., 2004) . This data can then be cloned on empty tags raising counterfeiting issues. Privacy violation arises from the fact that when individual goods are tagged, the manufacturers, retailers and consumers will be able to share tracking the goods beyond point-of-sale because they are associated to goods movement and the data. Even if the tags only contain product codes rather than unique serial numbers, consumers" purchase interests and tastes in various product brands can also betray their identity. Moreover, even if the responses of tags are encrypted, the owner can be identified and tracked by the fixed encrypted code (Juels, 2006; Henrici and Muller, 2004) . While consumers are afraid of omnipresent surveillance (loss of privacy, objects being associated with people), organizations are primarily interested in protecting company-internal data from unauthorized access and unauthorized manipulation. However, the privacy and security problems are not completely independent of one another, considering the fact that data security represents a required prerequisite to guarantee data privacy. So the question is: How can we protect and ensure RFID tag content security without compromising data privacy?
Based on the analysis of the traditional trust framework on sensor networks and knowledge-based systems in supply chain management, Mahinderjit-Singh and proposed a seven-layer trust framework for RFID-enabled SCM. The trust framework provides functions for the trustworthiness of large-scale RFID global tracking systems and the usefulness of RFID systems. In addition, the trust framework functions as a preventive and detective mechanism for security attacks. Out of the seven layers in the trust framework, layer two -Privacy is discussed further in this paper. The privacy component is designed to support the handling of security attacks such as cloning because tracking RFID tags is an essential step in cloning and this act may compromise a partner"s privacy. Thus, this layer is necessary to ensure privacy protection while dealing with cloning attacks. The context of privacy factors such as time (data privacy) and locality (location privacy) is utilized based on different applications that the framework will handle. For certain applications that require tracking such as supply chains and drug pedigree tracing, privacy is a sensitive issue since the tracing and tracking processes may violate privacy in the first place. The question here is on how we can control privacy in applications such as supply chains which employ traceability capabilities in products handling.
In term of RFID security, both prevention and detection modules are crucial. Prevention of RFID tags cloning involves the design and development of tags from the physical layer up to application level. In contrast to prevention, the detection module focuses only on the application level. An intrusion detection function can tackle a compromised system more precisely since the knowledge of how and what has attacked the system is more clear compared to a prevention system. Prevention techniques are not guaranteed and may let an attack through, but dealing with a compromised system by responding to suspicious behavior and generating an alarm is possible with a detection system. Based on Deckard proposal (Mirowski and Harnett, 2007) , RFID cloning and fraud attacks can only be overcome with countermeasures beyond static preventive mechanism. Since many previous researches focuses on tags preventive models, we agree with Mirowski and Harnett (2007) that detection of cloning and fraud attack are the first defense in eliminating these security attacks.
However, the issue we tackle here is beyond the effort to minimise the error rate: the aim is to improve the percentage of the incorrect prediction of class labels and to deliver higher detection accuracy. In real-world applications, cost is treated unequally and the misclassification cost can be significant. We argue that a cost sensitive approach is essential in reducing the risk of counterfeiting in a supply chain. For example, in medical diagnosis of a cancer disease, if the cancer is regarded as the positive class, and noncancer (healthy) is regarded as the negative class, then missing a cancer (the patient is actually positive but is classified as negative), is called a "false negative" and is much more serious (thus expensive) than the false-positive error. The patient could lose his or her life because of the delay in the correct diagnosis and treatment. Similarly, in RFID clone and fraud detection, a false negative or failure to detect fraudulent tags could be very expensive with counterfeit items reaching the market and causing millions of dollars of loss.
The contributions of this paper are: 1) demonstration of how privacy can be protected in an open environment such as an RFID-enabled supply chain with assistance of a cloning and fraud detection system; and 2) presentation of a cost-based detection model in a supply chain environment. The objective of the cost-based detection is to classify RFID tags using supervised learners to categorise RFID tags and detect the genuine (good) and fraudulent (bad) tags. Our RFID tag clone and fraud detector will employ RFID SCM
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SCM Privacy and Security Concerns
In general it is hard, if not impossible, to maintain privacy without security. Security is the ability of RFID systems to keep the information transmitted between tags and readers secure from non-intended recipients. Meanwhile, privacy is the ability of the RFID system to keep the meaning of the information transmitted between the tag and the reader secure from non-intended recipients. The main security challenge with RFID is due to the nature of RFID tag operations. Tags are "promiscuous"", means that they can be read by entities outside their owner"s knowledge. The privacy concerns involved in tracing and tracking that include the profiling of products and secret tag reading (Ayoade, 2007) .
In tracking, static data held and transmitted by a tag can be used to keep a record of the tag"s location. If this data can be linked to the identity of an item in any way, it also makes it possible to track that item (Juels, 2006) . On the other hand, inventorying requires that the tag either holds explicit information of the item it belongs to (for instance "what the item is"), or that similar data can be looked up somewhere else using the tag"s ID. In this way, it is possible to make an inventory of the RFID-tagged items that are moving. Information disclosure through the data leakage attacks will occur when information is exposed to an unauthorized party (Langheinrich, 2009) . Instead of reading a tag directly, one can also eavesdrop on a reader-to-tag channel (or even a tag-to-reader channel) and an attacker could skim tag"s data without the tag carrier"s consent. Data leakage in RFID technology is a threat from applications which obtain more information from a tag than necessary, or store more information than needed. The effect of data leakage is more than just a privacy violation. It causes one of the worst threats in a supply chain environment, ie., the counterfeiting. Counterfeiting of products causes losses of billions of dollars and losses of human trust in RFID technology.
In RFID applications, an RFID tag may change its owner multiple times within its life time. To tackle this issue, a secure ownership transfer is essential. Ownership transfer means that once a RFID tag is transferred between two different owners, all information associated with the tag will need to be passed over as well. This should be done without compromising the privacy of either old or new owners in order to ensure that further tracing and retaining of the tag"s information are not possible. Some ownership protocols that tackle ownership transfers are proposed by Osaka et al. (2006) , Saito et al. (2005) and Song (2008) . The Osaka-Takagi-Yamazaki-Takahashi (OTYT) protocol (Osaka et al., 2006) uses the symmetric encryption and hashing methods and provides privacy protection for both new and old owners. However, without any consideration of after-sale information recovery, this scheme is prone to message manipulation attacks since imitated random numbers could be used to query a tag twice. The Saito protocol (Saito et al., 2005) uses the three-way authentication using a trusted third party (TTP) server but is prone to eavesdropping and only supports the privacy of new owners. This is because their scheme is to provide support for the backward channel (the path through which energy travels from the RFID tag to the reader) without consideration of forward channel (path through which energy travels from the reader to the RFID tag) communications. Based on the security analysis performed by Pedro (2010) , there are three important ownership transfers, which are: (i) new owner privacy, (ii) old owner privacy and (iii) authorisation recovery for transaction after POS. However, the mutual authentication method used is prone to many attacks such as the tag and server impersonation, data leakage, and denial-of-service attacks. As a result, it"s hard to ensure privacy without security if only symmetric cryptosystem is used without a setup of secured server"s communications.
Ayoade (2007) classified privacy into two categories, namely, data privacy and location privacy, which he argued as the consequences of the enhanced trace and track concept in an RFID-enabled supply chain. The location privacy of a person is at risk if a tag ID associated with that person is spotted at a particular reader location. Meanwhile, data privacy violations occur when rogue readers sniff a legitimate transaction and trick the tag into disclosing its personal data. In curbing privacy violation some methods use RFID components such as tags and readers. Example approaches are: (a) tag killing proposed by Auto-ID Center ( http://autoid.mit.edu/cs/) , in which tags of sold items are disabled or removed at the point-of sale; (b) tag blocking (Juels et al., 2003) , in which a blocker tag creates a radio frequency environment that prevents unauthorized scanning of consumer items; and (iii) applying hash encryption and randomized hash (Weis et al., 2003) so that the information stored in tags is encrypted in a dynamic manner, rewriteable memory and random number approach (Gao, 2004) , in which only authorized readers are able to access the tags. Juels (2005) also proposed a practical two-way authentication (reader-totag and tag-to-reader) technique by using a PIN in electronic product code (EPC) tags. The resistance of EPC tags to skimming attack through this approach can prove to be valuable in real-world systems. However, these approaches only provide partial or temporary benefits. For example, tag killing causes the loss of all RFID benefits and the blocker approach carries the risk of unreliability.
An RFID application system should always include both privacy and security in its design structure and the focus of any RFID application system proposal should be on the information system and not the technology. Hargraves and Shafer (2004) suggested that identifiability, observability and linkability of RFID tags with associated data should be minimized and the RFID system should be developed with authorization, authentication, and encryption on a routine basis to ensure the trustworthiness of the RFID system. In VeriSign (2008) , an innovative way to minimize the sharing of information is by applying a distributed network architecture. This type of networked RFID system ensures that partners only store their serialized information about each product in a database and this information is accessible only to authenticated and trusted partners. Another approach is to apply policies proposed in (Garfinkel et al., 2005) . Their paper emphasizes the need for guidelines that require human and technological intervention and the education of users for accessing RFID technology and understanding how privacy can be preserved.
RFID Cloning Detection
RFID cloning detection can be done through the use of PUF-based RFID chips and an intrusion detection system. A Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF) (Devadass et al., 2008) can be useful to combat cloning. PUF-based RFID chips cannot be cloned, and provide a strong and robust authentication mechanism. A PUF-based RFID chip employs challenge-response authentication and random properties in its manufacturing. As a result, the PUF authentication process is easy to generate but hard to characterise and guess. Even though Devadass et al. (2008) suggested that a PUF chip is suitable for RFID applications such as access control application, the tag is still costly for supply chain application and the performance can be compromised by temperature.
RFID application systems are built on networked architecture which allows us to use intrusion detection techniques to detect a threat. This is a low cost solution to improve RFID application system security without the need of changing existing RFID technical standards. Two examples are the Deckard System (Mirowski & Hartnett, 2007) and its improved versions (Thamilarasu & Sridhar, 2008) . The system does not need to know any predefined correct behaviour patterns, but it is prone to false positives. It uses a network intrusion detection method to detect unauthorized RFID tag cloning, unauthorized RFID tag disabling, man in-the-middle attacks between RFID tags and readers, among other aberrations.
One of the disadvantages of intrusion detection is its high false alarm rate (Mirowski & Hartnett, 2007) . Trace-based solutions for clone detection were initially conceived for the pharmaceutical industry; Koh et al. (2003) suggested a method to record track-and-trace data of tagged pharmaceutical products in order to create drug pedigrees. Staake et al. (2005) discussed the deployment of track-and-trace solutions with plausibility checks to detect counterfeits within EPCglobal (VeriSign, 2004) networks, pointed out the negative effect of incomplete drug pedigrees due to the partners who do not record or store tracing data. EPCglobal is a non-profit organization set up to achieve worldwide adoption and standardization of EPC technology. Lehtonen et al. (2007) explored trace-based clone detection from incomplete traces through machine learning techniques. The authors considered that the incomplete traces are caused by both tag misreading and partners not sharing tag observations. All these solutions assume either a central repository that stores all tag observations or that partners share tag observations in plaintext; given the concerns that partners have regarding the possible use of tag observations to infer sensitive information. None of those proposed solutions can be directly applicable in a real-world scenario.
Counterfeiting in RFID SCM
RFID Tag Cloning, Fraud, and Counterfeiting
RFID tag cloning occurs in the form of cloned tags on fake products or clone tags on genuine products. Both types are similar in terms of the cloned tags:
 Clone: An RFID tag is cloned when a tag identification number (TID) and its form factors are copied to an empty tag (Lehtonen et al., 2009) . Hence, there will be the same tag data structure on two different products.
 Fraud: In contrast, fraud is an act of using the cloned tags and adding the serial numbers of future EPC codes. These future EPC codes are the codes in the systems, which are yet to be tagged to the products.
 Counterfeiting: On the other hand, counterfeiting is a more generic term that includes both the act of cloning and fraud of RFID tags and tagging onto fake products in the market for personal benefit.
There are four different attacks that contribute to the cloning attacks in an RFID application system (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2010) . Skimming attacks occur when RFID tags are read directly without anyone"s knowledge.
Eavesdropping attacks happen when an attacker sniffs the transmission between the tag and reader to capture the tag data. Man-in-the-middle attacks occur when a fake reader is used to trick the genuine tags and readers during data transmission. RFID tag data could also be altered using this technique and, as a result, fraudulent tags could be generated too. Physical attacks, which require expertise and expensive equipment, take place in laboratory on expensive RFID tags and security embedded tags. The RFID supply chain management that faces these threats is discussed in next section.
RFID Supply Chain Management
The strength of any RFID application is fully capitalised when the temporal and location information is correctly utilised in eliminating the data security issue in RFID technology. Real-time monitoring of events such as fraud and cloning attacks in RFID applications are still rare. . RFID tags are attached to the products, for instance, wine bottles. The RFID-based supply chain system involves the movement and flow of millions of data. The data generated consists of RFID tuples in the form of (EPC, location, time), where EPC is the unique identifier read by an RFID reader, location is the place where the RFID reader scanned the item, and time is the time when the reading took place. The data generated for the RFID-based supply chain involves different supply chain partners and each partner performing different business steps and disposition . Mahinderjit-Singh and Li"s (2009) seven-layer trust framework resides in a centralized server with an Object Naming Service (ONS) and EPC-Information Service (EPC-IS) repository (VeriSign, 2004) . The fifth layer, the detection module, consists of predefined rules of a real-time monitoring and tracking system. The tracking and monitoring system can even play a role as an intrusion detection system by using an event rule and trigger function in the database.
Data Structure
The data privacy and security issues can be handled by assigning a time constraint on RFID tags. The time-to-live (TTL) value indicates the time restriction that target events should satisfy. Since most RFID applications have a time restriction, we believe if carefully defined, we can use the notion of TTL to detect clones and fraudulent tags in a typical SCM. Based on TTL taxonomy , there are four different notions of TTL based on the event types (including both primitive and complex events): absolute TTL (TTLa), relative TTL (TTLr), periodic TTL (TTLp) and sequential TTL (TTLsE). The detection process of cloned and fraudulent tags is able to manipulate all of the above TTL notions. However, based on RFID applications, we determine that the three relevant TTL notions for an SCM transaction and monitoring process are TTLa, TTLr and TTLs. We also argue that the absolute TTL (TTLa) notion can be further categorised based on RFID applications. Some applications such as pharmaceuticals and fast moving products (for example, dairy and foodstuff) require restriction in expiry date as the TTLa compared to products such as wine and jewellery. For these expensive products more emphasis is placed on manufacturing time. We will introduce a new notion of TTL called initial TTL (TTL i).
TTLi specifies the period of time an RFID tag is tagged on the product. By tracking, monitoring and storing the TTLi in the system, we are able to discern cloned RFID tags from genuine tags. Below are some examples to show the practicality of the usage of TTL:
i) Example 1 -Initial TTL (TTLi): Suppose 1000 new RFID tags have been purchased from the manufacturer. Each tag is then scanned by the reader denoting the birth time of the tags. Once the tag is tagged to a product such as wine, the expiry time of the tag is also stored. The period between this birth time and expiry time is calculated as initial TTL. For products such as wine, TTLi is extremely important. Since the TTLi is an event happening at the manufacturing site, any fraudulent injection of fake wine bottles after the manufacturing site can be detected.
ii) Example 2 -Relative TTL (TTLr): In a wine-based SCM, when the wines bottles are transported from the manufacturing site to the distribution site, the transportation period needs to be carefully tracked. If the time to reach a destination is more than its relative TTL, an alarm will be raised as the state of the bottles is suspicious. Relative TTL also indicates the time period from when the bottles are scanned by multiple readers at the front door of the distributor up to the time period the bottles leave the site. Thus the TTLr can be categorised as the transfer TTL (TTLt) and site TTL (TTLs). TTLt is the restriction time for all the movement time from one point to the other. Meanwhile, TTLs is the whole site location (for example, Manufacturer, Distributor and Retailer) period from the time it enters a site where it will be processed for unpacking or repacking up to the time it leaves the site.
iii) Example 3 -Sequential TTL (TTLsE): The products" movement from the manufacturing site up to the retail site is denoted by the TTLsE. TTLsE is the sum of all the TTLr in a supply chain. If the time from the manufacturing site until the retail site exceeds or is less than the TTLsE, the event could be suspicious. The equations for TTL are listed as below.
SiteTTL (TTLs) = Time of RFID within a site such as Manufacturer, Distributor and Retailer
TTLs = tend (Distribution site) -tstart (Distribution site) TransferTTL (TTLt) = Time taken when moving products from site A to site B Sequential TTL (TTLsE) = Overall accumulated time from Manufacturing site up to Retail site
The audit data for a single RFID is given below:
Audit tag, for a single RFID tag , T = < Po, Pm, Psd, Pt, Pr > where: Po= operation match rate, Pm =mean of TTL, where TTL = { TTLs,TTLt, TTLsE} Psd =standard deviation of TTL, where TTL = { TTLs,TTLt, TTLsE} Pt = rate of tag responses, and Pr = R/W (mean and standard deviation) rate.
Protection of counterfeiting involves the costs of system performance. In next section, we provide an overview of various cost-sensitive methods for handling of the counterfeiting problems.
Cost-Sensitive Learning
Cost-sensitive learning is a type of machine learning that takes the misclassification costs (and possibly other types of cost) into consideration. The goal of this type of learning is to minimize the total system costs (Turney, 2000) .
Many works dealing with different misclassification costs have been undertaken. They can be categorised into two groups. One is on the design of cost-sensitive learning algorithms directly Drummond & Holte, 2000) . The other is on the design of a wrapper that converts existing cost-insensitive learning algorithms into cost-sensitive ones. The wrapper methods are also called cost-sensitive meta-learning (Witten & Frank, 2005; Domingos, 1999) , sampling (Zadrozny, 2003) , and weighting (Ting, 1998) . Costsensitive meta-learning is to convert existing cost-insensitive learning algorithms into cost-sensitive ones without modifying them. Cost-sensitive meta-learning techniques can also be considered in two different ways: sampling and non-sampling, in terms of whether the distribution of training data is modified or not according to the misclassification costs. Our work focuses on the non-sampling cost-sensitive metalearning approaches for the development of a generic framework of the privacy and security protections. The non-sampling approaches can be further considered in three different ways: relabelling, weighting, and threshold adjusting. The first involves the relabelling of classes of instances, by applying the minimum expected cost criterion (Witten & Frank, 2005) . Relabelling is divided into two branches: relabelling the training instances (Witten & Frank, 2005) and relabelling the test instances (Domingos, 1999) . As shown in Table 1 , C (i, i) (TP and TN) is usually regarded as the "benefit" (i.e., negated cost) when an instance is predicted correctly. This is the minimum expected cost principle in relabelling approaches such as MetaCost (Witten & Frank, 2005) and CostSensitive Classifier (Domingos, 1999) . In Table 1 , cost C is known as the learning time. The technique to modify the inputs to the learning algorithm to reflect cost C includes:
 If there are 2 classes and the cost of a false positive is λ times larger than the cost of a false negative, put a weight of λ on each negative training example In this section we discuss how RFID tag cloning and fraud detection as well as cost modeling are supported by the seven-layer trust framework (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2010) . Our RFID detection system has three main components: pre-processing, detection, and response and decision, as shown in Figure 2 . Pre-processing is the component that collects an RFID event set E that is supplied by different supply chain partners. RFID event sets are then sent to the detection component where the information sources are analyzed. Several detection functions are performed in this component, such as pattern matching, traffic or protocol analysis, and finite state transition. The response component notifies the system administrator where and when an intrusion takes place and calculates the total cost of any attack. WEKA, an open source Java package which contains machine learning algorithms and cost algorithms such as the MetaCost algorithm as shown in Figure 3 , is used for solving the RFID cloning issue in an SCM. 
Evaluation
In the studied supply chain, the tracing of products begins either at the manufacturer"s production line or at the contract packer"s packaging line. Products are shipped to the distributor in pallets and the distributor uses a "receive, unpack, pack and sent process" to fill boxes that fulfil the retailer"s orders. The distributor delivers products to the retailer 2 to 3 times a day according to orders. The last event in a product"s trace occurs when it is scanned in to the retailer inventory for the shelfing process. The trace"s final process is the point-of-sale process which takes place at the retail site.
We have built a model of the described supply chain in our own supply chain simulator. The simulator works with three hour-long discrete time steps. The model is built based on documentation and interviews and it has been validated with direct feedback and example track and trace data. In the simulator, each supply chain node is presented by three different locations corresponding to the business steps of receiving, packaging unpacking, tagging, shelfing and shipping. The length of time an object spends in these locations is given by a uniform distribution. If the product enters a location where there is a reader device, and no read error occurs, a track and trace event is generated. Applying the dataset from the simulated RFID supply chain, 3500 examples of RFID traces are generated from the manufacturing site up to the retail site. The RFID traces are then preprocessed into an audit dataset which includes attributes such as Tags ID, location ID, TTLs (mean), TTLt (mean), TTLsE (mean and standard deviation) and Read/write (mean and standard deviation).
Twenty-five counterfeit products or 0.7% from genuine traces events are injected into randomly chosen non-manufacturer supply chain locations. The counterfeit products have ID numbers of randomly chosen genuine products so the events they generate appear in traces of 25 different genuine products. In some rare cases a counterfeit and a genuine product with the same ID are both scanned during the same time step. These cases are not considered in the results. The audit data will then be fed into a filtering system upfront for normalization purposes. CfsSubsetEval and the Best First technique are used to determine the evaluation of attributes and search methods. The counterfeit tags are detected by using classification algorithms from WEKA tool ( http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/~ml/weka.). In addition, the datasets are also fed into the WEKA engine by applying a cost-sensitive algorithm which is the MetaCost algorithm.
The five base classifiers used were Naive Bayes, Random Forest and WEKA's implementation of a Support Vector Machine (SVM, JRIP and C4.5 (J48) decision tree. Default WEKA options were used for the Naive Bayes, Random Forest and JRIP but the SVM "build logistic models" was set to true and the J48 tree "Pruning" was disabled. The standard cost-sensitive classifier was used for Naive Bayes, SVM and Random Forest. There are two main goals of the classification experiments -firstly, to find the most robust and versatile classifier for an imbalanced RFID dataset, and secondly, to find out the optimal misclassification cost setting for a classifier. The model is trained with a training dataset. To train the classifier models, cross-validation technique was employed. Cross-validation is a standard statistical technique where the training and validation data set is split into several parts of equal size, for example 10% of the compounds for a 10 fold cross-validation. An independent test dataset is simulated as well. However, for the differing classifiers, across-the-board costs of 20, 40, 60, 80,100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000 and 10000 are used. WEKA normalises (reweights) the cost matrix to ensure that the sum of the costs equals the total amount of instances.
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a plot of the probability of true positive (recall) as a function of the probability of false alarm across all threshold settings. An ROC curve provides an intuitive way to evaluate the classification performance of the RFID detection system. Recall represents the probability of detection of cloned tags and precision is the proportion of the correctly predicted genuine tags in each prediction class. In this study, we will utilise ROC, recall and precision for the model evaluation. The result will be discussed in the next section.
Discussion
In this section, we illustrate the results of the detection algorithms without cost and with cost properties. Figure 4 shows the result of counterfeit product detection using the WEKA classification algorithm. There are no cost properties applied here. The Naive Bayes classifier has the highest true positive rate (0.97) and proved to be the best classifier to detect counterfeit products. In cloning detection of a RFID-enabled supply chain, misclassifying a cloned tag as genuine is undesirable and incurs a high cost. Our experimental result shows that when increasing the cost-ratio from 20 to 10,000, the recall rate would increase. Although not unexpected, the decrease of precision implies needless analysis of a large number of false positives (shown in Figure 5 ). SVM, JRIP and J48 algorithms consistently reach Recall rates close to 1 at high cost-ratios, with precision slightly above 0.1. Based on the data in Figure 6 , we can conclude that as the cost-ratio increases, the accuracy of the classifier decreases as well. Performance measurements are analysed for every cost-ratio as shown in Table 2 . The Naive Bayes is quite different from the other four classifiers. Its performance indices (TP rate, FP rate) are rather constant regardless of the cost (Figures 7-9 ). An important implication from this study is that we can use cost to choose a suitable operational threshold (based on different cost-ratio) to control a classifier"s performance. In this study, four classifiers except the Naive Bayes provide this flexibility. In practice, exact costs are rarely known and could change as we learn more about factors such as the system requirements, the design and operational environment. When considering a wide range of cost-ratios, the resulting models differ significantly. For instance, as shown in Figure 9 , J48 classifier is made cost-sensitive when the cost-ratio was set to 500 with accuracy of 35.1%. This means that the FN needs to be 500 times more expensive than FP for J48 to transform to cost-sensitive. Overall, J48 provides is the most robust and versatile classifier for an imbalanced RFID dataset compared to other classifiers.
The cost-ratios in our experiments, which vary from 20 to 10,000, might not include all meaningful cost differentials. This is because different intrusion detection systems may have their own cost ranges of interests. So the selection of classifiers is another possible source of bias. We cannot exclude the possibility that a classifier not studied here could show significantly better performance. Nevertheless, we believe that the chance of such a classification algorithm being in existence is rather low. The results above could be limited by the small datasets used in the training models. When small datasets are used, the classifier cannot accurately estimate the class membership probabilities and the imbalance in class distribution of the dataset.
Any RFID clone detection classifiers used must be correlated with cost, since lower cost properties project to lower or zero cloned tags in the system. This also impacts positively in reducing the counterfeit attack which risks billions of dollars in losses every year in the market. The next section provides an overview of privacy concerns and its countermeasures. An example of an SCM complying with the EPCglobal is also provided.
Privacy Protection in SCM
Trust Management Privacy Architecture
In the seven-layer trust framework (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009) , both security and privacy contexts are integrated at the first 5 layers. The trust framework could be applied to maintain an RFID application system which is able to handle security threats such as cloning without compromising privacy effects. Layer-2 Privacy looks into the time and locality factors which are similar to data and location privacy. Mahinderjit-Singh and Li (2009) argued that the privacy component is able to handle cloning attacks because the tracking of tags is an essential step stone towards cloning and this may compromise a partner"s privacy. Thus, this layer is necessary to ensure privacy protection while dealing with cloning attacks. We also believe trust management is the key for the overall protection of security and privacy in an RFID system. A trust management solution through the use of public key certificates (i.e., a certificate authority (CA)) is able to establish and evaluate the trust relationship between various supply chain partners. A trustworthy relationship between two partners requires: 1) authentication -the CA is used to authenticate the partners before any transaction takes place;, 2) non-repudiation -only the authenticated partners are able to perform a transaction and they cannot deny that they are the sender or the recipient of a transaction; and 3) confidentiality and privacy -information shared between the partners has nothing to do with the partner"s sensitive or confidential information. Figure 10 shows the classification of security and privacy in the context of an open and closed supply chain environment. The highest level provides the solution to both the privacy and security threats in RFID supply chain management by applying the sevenlayer trust framework. As shown in Table 3 , we have determined how privacy violations can take place in an RFID-enabled supply chain environment. The scenarios are divided based on whether they are in an open or closed loop environment with affected parties and different types of privacy attacks and consequences from the attack. 1. An agent could purchase a competitor"s products from several locations, and then monitor the locations" replenishment dynamics. This scenario occurs with itemlevel tagging 2. A competitor or thief performs an unauthorized inventory of a store by scanning tags with a reader to determine the types and quantities of items. 
Countermeasures for Preventing Privacy Violations
In the clone detector, ways to prevent privacy violations in an RFID-enabled supply chain include:
1.
The EPCglobal Discovery Service (DS) is equipped with key management mechanisms using ElGamal or RSA encryption algorithms (cite). The clone detector is installed on the DS. The partners that need to access the clone detector will have to go through the DS for authenticity, and only permitted personnel are given permission to access information. Before using the clone detector, all players obtain the necessary information to establish a connection to each other through the DS, which knows who owns an event on a certain ID and can the bootstrap the network upon a partner request for detecting clones of ID.
2.
Distributed network architecture is employed. The distributed network architecture eliminates the problem of information overload and makes it easier to exchange information (VeriSign, 2008) . Manufacturers as well as all trading partners create and store their own serialised information about each and every product. The manufacturer will manage and host a database that stores information about the generation of products, while trading partners host and manage similar databases storing information about product movement through the supply chain. Each involved partner will make this information available to authorised parties over the internet. This will ensure minimal sharing of local tracking data (times and places) with the EPC network.
3.
The ONS (Object Name Service) could be used to find an address in the EPCglobal network where information about the product being questioned is stored. The information stored there should be in minimal granularity that has limited timestamp information. By limiting timestamp accessible data, the effect of data leakage and data privacy can be minimised.
4.
Default killing of RFID tags at store exits or password protection of RFID tag content could be set up. This means that the production tag which is used for tagging on the product within the supply chain will be deactivated at the POS Point of Sale) exit. This will reduce the possibility of tracking and inventorying for the purposes for profiling done by the supply chain partners especially the manufacturer in learning the behavior of the consumer. In addition, a new tag can be placed on the tag after the purchase of the product that comes along with warranties. This information should be accessible only by the manufacturer and consumer.
5.
Partial or no saving of full EPC serial numbers should always be applied on RFID tags in an RFID-enabled supply chain environment.
6. There can be rigorous controls and transparency of EPC network access rights. A role-based access control (RBAC) policy should always be implemented together with item-level tagging (Illic et al., 2007) . The main purpose of the RBAC policy is allowing only certain individuals to access certain levels of information. By applying this policy, we are able to limit the accessibility by different roles of personnel in an organization.
7.
Deletion or archive of all product data after a certain period of time. After a while, the entire product data linked by the tag ID and the database should be offline. This requirement reduces any form of tracking violation and curbs fraud situations from occurring. However, this might stamp out the advantages of an RFID system in a supply chain such as providing global visibility and traceability.
8. Any supply chain partner could exercise control over personal information on sold products available on the EPC network. This will limit any misuse of product information by the consumer and competitors in learning about the supply chain partner"s financial gain in forecasting sales information. In addition, a competitor could also use this information in creating cloned tags with similar product information on fake products for future transactions.
9.
All RFID transactions and information transmissions in the RFID supply chain require consent from both parties, namely, the business owner and consumer. By complying with Garfinkel et al."s proposed policy (2005) , RFID organizations in a supply chain environment need to be aware of their full rights especially to know when, where, and why an RFID tag is being read. To comply with it, organizations could post a sign wherever RFID readers operate. Embedding this policy with a detection system is possible when a tag equipped with memory could count the number of times it has been read (Mirowski, and Hartnett, 2007) . .
RFID-enabled Detection and Privacy Architecture
In this section we design a cost-based RFID tag cloning detector that can be embedded into the seven-layer trust framework and into the EPCglobal service. Figure 11 gives an outline of how our proposed detection system will work in a supply chain environment and in an EPCglobal network (VeriSign, 2004) . Privacy concerns are also addressed here.
The following assumptions are used in our system:
1. By utilizing the seven-layer trust framework, detection functions take place in layer-4. 2.
The trust framework is placed in EPCglobal services. 3.
The local EPC-IS only shares information that can be accessed by all assigned supply chain partners.
4.
Distributed network architecture is employed. Distributed network architecture eliminates the problem of information overload and makes it easier to exchange information.
5.
The discovery service records incoming and outgoing products and tracks products by using item-level tagging. The DS functions as a key management server in which it generates public keys for System Administrator (SA) testing purposes. The EPCglobal DS is equipped with a key management mechanism using a specific cryptography algorithm for public key encryption (the RSARivest, Shamir & Adleman -encryption). It stores access control policies that comply with the role-based access system. A role-based access control system has two phases in assigning privileges to an employee: first the employee is assigned one or more roles, and then the role(s) are checked against the requested operation. 6.
Supply chain partner authentication is done through a certificate authority service using the trust framework. The partners that need to access the clone detector must provide their local certificate to the CA server installed in the trust framework. 7.
The ONS could be used to point to an address in the EPCglobal network where information about the product being questioned is stored. This service is important if a product needs to be traced and tracked. 8.
Item-level tagging is employed in our scenario. 9.
Attackers could be either from the organization or outsiders. There are eight main different points used by attackers to inject cloned and fraud in the SCM. 10.
Privacy violation in a typical RFID supply chain can be controlled by employing Layer-2 Privacy from the trust framework. The procedure for hindering privacy violation is outlined in Section 5.2. A. An EPC lifecycle begins when a manufacturer tags a product. At the manufacturer"s site, EPC tags are fixed to products. These EPC tags are furnished with codes and KILL/ACCESS passwords, upfront. B.
A manufacturer records product information in the local EPC-IS. C.
The EPC-IS registers EPC knowledge with EPC Discovery Services. D.
Before the product leaves the manufacturer"s site, the product is fed into the clone detector. E.
The result is sent to the manufacturer"s local EPC-IS. If a cloned tag is detected, a trigger is sent to the manufacturer"s system administrator. F.
If a cloned tag is not detected, the supplier is requested to move the product to the distributor"s front door. G.
At the front door, the distributor records the product in their local EPC-IS. H.
The EPC-IS records with the EPC DS where tags are next fed into the clone detector. I.
If a clone is detected, the distributor"s SA is triggered. The alarm log is kept in the DS. Role-based access control policies and privileges granted for what role and which personnel are stored in the DS as well. J.
The alarm log is sent to the distributor"s local EPC-IS. K.
Before the product leaves the distributor"s site (at the back door), the RFID tags are fed into the clone detector again to check if there have been any cloning or fraudulent processes at the distribution site. L.
Once confirmed as genuine tags, the distributor sends the tagged products to the retail site. The same process takes place at the retail site. M.
Any supply chain partner can access any other partner"s EPC-IS for tracking and tracing purposes. Figure 11 shows a complete supply chain transaction between manufacturer-distributor and retailer within an EPCglobal technology using only passive tags. The transaction involves some injection of cloning and fraudulent tags into legitimate transactions. For the preservation of RFID privacy, besides employing user policies for controlling the access of information in the system, ownership transfer between partners can also be supported. By using one of the ownership transfer protocols discussed in Section 2.2, the security of the ownership transfer protocols can be maintained if the communication channel is secured. Another way to ensure a secured transfer of information will be to allow access to information to all partners in the local EPC-IS without handing out any sensitive information such as sales and forecasting information. The conclusion we could draw here is that by following one or more of the privacy guidelines discussed in Section 5.2, we are able to protect the whole supply chain running on an EPCglobal network platform.
Conclusion
In this paper, two layers: Layer-2 Privacy and Layer-5 Detection, from the seven-layer trust framework are investigated for application in RFID-enabled supply chain management. In an RFID-enabled supply chain system, privacy concerns require urgent attention especially to control the counterfeiting. Security principles such as authorization, authentication and encryption need to be combined with privacy procedures to maintain data integrity and privacy. Protection of privacy is critical for both consumers and business owners in order to maintain a trustworthy relationship between them.
In addition, classifiers used in RFID clone detection must always be associated with the performance cost since lower misclassification cost project to lower or zero cloned tags in the system. This also impacts positively in reducing the counterfeit attack which risks billions of dollars in losses every year in markets. We have shown that when the relabelling approach is used, we are able to reduce the misclassification cost and eliminate the scenario of having cloned and fraudulent tags in the system.
Nevertheless, RFID tag cloning and fraud can be detected in a supply chain at an initial stage if there is proper transfer of ownership with secure and authorized information exchange mechanism. This is made possible by integrating the monitoring, detection, and security and privacy functions from the seven-layer trust framework model (MahinderjitSingh, M. and Li, X. ,2009) which focuses on reducing risks and increasing benefits such as eliminating counterfeiting tags in SCM systems and boosting supply chain players" confidence.
In future work, we aim to extend our RFID cloning and fraud detection framework by using outlier detection techniques to identify illegitimate RFID tags and designing an improved cost decision model to calculate the damage, response and operational costs for a typical RFID clone detector system in a supply chain application. In addition, we would like to enhance RFID supply chain privacy and security in terms of context-awareness.
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